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Submarine repair schedules are some of the most complex schedules seen in project 
management.  Repairs of a nuclear U.S. submarine are resource constrained since 
resources are divided among approximately thirty shops (e.g. electricians, welders, and 
pipefitters). The system complexity, the tight spaces, the operational nuclear reactor, the 
challenges inherent in repair, and resource competition all contribute to a dense 
integrated schedule.  Minimizing   the  overall   length  of  each  project,   the   “makespan,”   is  
the primary objective function of this thesis.  This thesis uses a commercially available 
simulation package, @Risk, to analyze a realistic submarine repair schedule.  Simulation 
is used to analyze uncertainty in the task durations and identify crucial tasks that highly 
impact the makespan.  Finally, a genetic algorithm is tested to assign resources to 
minimize the makespan.  The submarine repair data was based on a schedule with 4038 
tasks and 7723 constraints or ties.  A simulation assigned all 4038 tasks a triangle 
probability distribution with the duration set at plus or minus 10 percent of the original 
duration estimate.  Sensitivity analysis of the simulation identified key task nodes having 
significant impact on the overall duration.  These top ten crucial tasks were then given 
similar probability distributions and another simulation was run keeping the remaining 
4028 tasks as deterministic durations.  Minimizing the makespan could only be executed 
on a small subset of data, 25 tasks, due to limiting assumptions on reducing task 
durations by assigning more resources.   An overall improvement of 5.5-15.6 % was 
achieved; this gives an indication of the approximate makespan optimization potential in 
current U.S. submarine repair, maintenance and overhaul operations. 
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 1 
I. PROBLEM BACKGROUND  
The field of project management has many foundations in the military 
shipbuilding industry.  Henry L. Gantt developed his namesake Gantt charts to manage 
ship construction during World War I.  In the 1950s, the U.S. Navy developed the 
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) for the Polaris missile program for 
nuclear submarines.1  Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Defense developed Earned 
Value Management to measure project progress.2  Ship construction and ship repair 
remain as significant practitioners of project management.  In particular, this research 
focuses on project management of U.S. shipyards with particular focus on nuclear 
submarine repair, maintenance and overhaul in the U.S. Navy. 
Lifecycle maintenance of U.S. nuclear submarines includes dry-docking repair 
periods of approximately 6-month or 18-month nominal durations.  The U.S. has four 
remaining public naval shipyards that conduct this nuclear maintenance:  Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, and Norfolk 
Naval Shipyard.  At any given time each of these shipyards typically has three to four 
submarines at different stages of repair or overhaul.  The schedules for the short minor 
maintenance availabilities have approximately 2,000 repair tasks while the longer major 
availabilities have approximately 8,000 repair tasks.  The schedules of the repairs are 
(human) resource constrained since resources are divided among approximately 30 shops 
(e.g., electricians, welders, and pipefitters).3  
Minimizing   the   overall   length   of   each   project,   the   “makespan,”   is   the   primary  
objective function.  Other objectives include minimizing cost and minimizing overtime. 
There are important precedence constraints (i.e., some tasks have to be completed before 
others can start) as well as co-location constraints (i.e., only a few workers can fit in a 
                                                 
1 Richard Chase, et al., Operations Management for Competitive Advantage (Boston, MA:  McGraw-
Hill, 200) 72.   
2 Wayne  Abba,  "How  Earned  Value  Got  to  Prime  Time:    A  Short  Look  Back  and  a  Glance  Ahead,”  31  
Oct. 2006 <http://www.evmlibrary.org/library/EVLook%20Back-Glance%20Ahead.abba.pdf>. 
3 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  2009). 
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small work area).  These types of project management scheduling problems, Resource 
Constrained Scheduling Problems (RCSP) are classified as NP-hard problems.4  
NP-hard is a category of problems in computational complexity theory.  A 
problem is NP-hard and considered inherently difficult when there does not exist an 
efficient   algorithm  with   a   “number   of   operations   that   is   polynomial   in   the   size   of   the  
input data.”5  Minimizing the makespan in a project schedule can be considered a subset 
of the constrained shortest path problem, an identified NP-hard problem. 
A. PRODUCTION IN THE INNOVATION ECONOMY (PIE) STUDY 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) started the Production in the 
Innovation  Economy  (PIE)  study  in  2011.    The  goal  is  to  “develop  recommendations for 
transforming America's production capabilities in an era of increased global 
competition.”6  In November 2012 the study began a two-year contract with the U.S. 
Navy to review U.S. shipbuilding and defense industries since they represent an 
important fraction of U.S. industrial activities. 
The MIT PIE study for the U.S. Navy has five tasks:  1) Innovation in bidding and 
contracting, 2) Project management, 3) Benchmarking shipyard performance, 4) Supply 
chain management, and 5) Prospects for U.S. commercial shipbuilding.7  This thesis 
work  supports  the  second  task  for  MIT’s  PIE  study  for  the  U.S.  Navy.  The  key  question  
is how project management practices in U.S. shipyards could be further improved to 
achieve productivity gains as measured against past results and also compared to foreign 
shipyards. Comparisons against foreign shipyards are outside the scope of this thesis, but 
a comparison of an optimized submarine repair schedule relative to an initial baseline is 
included in the thesis. 
                                                 
4 Gabriel  Burnett,  “Multiple Objective Assembly Scheduling with Spatial Resources and Recurring 
Tasks,” (Pennsylvania State University, 2011), 35. 
5 Ravindra Ahuja, et al., Network Flows:  Theory, Algorithms, and Applications (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ:  Prentice Hall, 1993), 788. 
6 "Production in the Innovation Economy," (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 12 Feb. 2013),  
<http://mit.edu/pie/about/index.html>. 
7 Oliver de Weck and Eric Rebentisch,  “Production in the Innovation Economy:  
How to Create Excellence Through Competition and Benchmarking in the U.S. Shipbuilding and Defense 
Industry,”  (MIT, Boston, MA, 2013), 3. 
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B. U.S. NAVAL SHIPYARDS  
1. Submarine Lifecycle Maintenance 
Lifecycle maintenance includes both depot maintenance, intermediate 
maintenance, and organizational-level maintenance.  Depot maintenance, or D-level, 
includes   “major   overhaul   or   a   complete   rebuilding of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, 
and  end  items,  including  the  manufacture  of  parts.”8  This complex level of repair work is 
done at a depot level facility, such as a shipyard.  Any work that requires the ship out of 
the water (i.e., in a drydock) is typically D-level maintenance.  Intermediate maintenance, 
or I-level, includes smaller repair work typically done pier side.  Organizational-level 
maintenance  is  done  by  the  ship’s  crew  onboard and consists of preventative maintenance 
and day-to-day servicing.9 
In the U.S. Navy all submarines and aircraft carriers are nuclear powered.  Built 
between 1976 and 1996, the Los Angeles, or 688-class, submarines make up the majority 
of the fast attack submarine inventory of the U.S. Navy.  Therefore, most submarine 
repair in the U.S. Navy is on Los Angeles class submarines. 
The notional total lifecycle maintenance plan of Los Angeles class submarines 
has changed over the years.  In 1974, two years before the first one was commissioned, 
the plan included a total of 1,024,000 man-days (or resource days) in 80 months of depot 
maintenance for the life of each submarine.  Currently the maintenance plan is drastically 
lower with only 546,400 man-days in 48.3 months of depot maintenance for each 
submarine.  This count of D-level activities excludes the yellow boxed PSA (Post 
Shakedown Availability) in Figure 1 since this maintenance is only done by the 
construction shipyard immediately following the initial build.10 
                                                 
8 Scott Williams, et al., "Visualizing Attack Submarine Maintenance Life Cycles," Intelligent Ships 




10 Mike Palczynski, “SUBMEPP:    Mission Capable.  Service Proven”  (MIT Mechanical Engineering 
Conference Room, Boston, MA: 17 Oct. 2012).   
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Figure 1. Evolution of Los Angeles Class Submarine Notional 
Maintenance Life Cycle11 
The   depot   level   maintenance   system   includes   the   green   boxed   “DSRA’s”  
(Docking Selected Restricted Availability), the blue boxed  “DMP”  (Depot  Maintenance  
Period),   the   cyan   boxed   “EOH”   (Engineered   Overhaul),   and   the   tan   boxed   “Inact”  
(inactivation or decommissioning).  Note   that   the   term  “availability”   is  used  among   the  
Naval shipyards to refer to any of these maintenance types:  DSRA, DMP, or EOH.  The 
DSRAs are generally less than six months and are considered minor availabilities.  The 
DMPs and EOHs take one to two years and are considered major availabilities.  During 
these periods the submarine is not available for service and occupies a drydock.  The grey 
circles represent fifteen nominal deployments of the submarine when it operates for six to 
eight months overseas.   
As the originally planned maintenance time was lowered, the number of 
deployments went from 12 in 1972 to 15 today.  Although the maintenance time was 
considerably lowered, this was done with a careful analysis of technical and operational 
                                                 
11 Mike Palczynski, “SUBMEPP:   Mission Capable.  Service Proven”  (MIT Mechanical Engineering 
Conference Room, Boston, MA: 17 Oct. 2012).   
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risk.  The Submarine Maintenance Engineering Planning and Procurement (SUBMEPP) 
activity is tasked with analyzing the maintenance risk of the entire submarine system for 
all classes of submarine.  The improvements were made by improving maintenance 
planning, reanalyzing data and adjusting reliability centered maintenance schedules, 
better subsystem performance, and other advancements. With all of these changes, the 
operational availability, Ao, of the Los Angeles class submarines has improved 
considerably over time.12 
2. Shipyard Organization 
 The U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) provides lifecycle 
engineering support to all of the vessels in the U.S. Navy.  One   of   NAVSEA’s  
directorates, NAVSEA-04, is in charge of logistics, maintenance and industrial 
operations.  This includes supervision of the public shipyards operated directly by the 
U.S. Navy.  Since 1972, the public shipyards have only conducted repair while new 
construction has been left to private shipyards.13 
During the 20th century, the Navy shut down nine of these public shipyards.  
Because of this drawdown the Navy contracts with private shipyards to perform 
maintenance on most of the conventionally powered ships.  The four remaining public 
shipyards primarily focus on the more complex repair of nuclear powered ships in the 
Navy:  submarines and aircraft carriers.  Work involving nuclear reactors also requires 
extra security and safety precautions that are more easily enforced in U.S. government 
controlled shipyards. The presence of an operating nuclear reactor also imposes 
significant schedule constraints.   The four public shipyards and their primary focus are 
shown in Figure 2.  There are approximately 22,000 personnel at these four shipyards 
compared to nearly 70,000 personnel at the eight shipyards the Navy had in 1996.14   
                                                 
12 Mike Palczynski, “SUBMEPP:    Mission Capable.  Service Proven”  (MIT Mechanical Engineering 
Conference Room, Boston, MA: 17 Oct. 2012).   
13 "Naval Ship Yards," U.S. Shipbuilding History, Shipbuilding Statistics, Tim Colton, 5 Dec. 2012, 
<http://shipbuildinghistory.com/history/shipyards/3public.htm>. 
14 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  
2009). 
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While the size of the shipyards has gone down, the number of major (greater than 
six month duration) maintenance availabilities has gone up.  In 1990, there were 11 EROs 
(Engineered Refueling Overhauls) or DMPs (Depot Maintenance Periods).  In 2007, 
there were over 35 major availabilities.15  This has driven the need for increased 
efficiency and productivity.  Schedule accuracy is a crucial component of executing this 
new workload efficiently. 
 
Figure 2. Four Active Public Naval Shipyards 
3. Advanced Industrial Management 
In the 1990s, the Navy created the Advanced Industrial Management (AIM) 
program to transition each of the public shipyards from a shop-managed maintenance 
plan to integrated project management.  One crucial aspect of this transition was the 
publication of the Baseline AIM Process Manual: a  10  chapter  instruction  describing  “the  
processes  and  products  necessary  to  implement”16 AIM concepts in the naval shipyards.    
                                                 
15 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  
2009). 
16 Baseline AIM Process Manual, Rev C, September 10, 1997, page ii. 
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As seen in Table 1, between 2004 and 2006, the public shipyards had been 
performing poorly, particularly in submarines:  averaging 24-months late (delay) total 
across the four shipyards.  The total delays began  to  impact  the  Navy’s  concept  of  force  
structuring (how many total ships were needed in the inventory).17  With between 50 to 
60 fast attack submarines in service during that period, two were effectively out of 
service due to maintenance delays.  Since the construction times take years, the Navy did 
not buy new submarines to replace this gap; however, the impact was felt in increased 
operational use of the remaining submarines.  Over the long term, with new submarines 
costing over $2 billion each, accepting the pattern of longer submarine maintenance 
periods has a cost much higher than just the immediate project management cost delays.    
 






Table 1.   Average Days Late for Public Shipyard Maintenance Availabilities on 
Aircraft Carriers and Submarines18 
4. Advanced Industrial Management - Next Generation 
  In 2006, NAVSEA headquarters began implementation of another new 
management program at the four naval shipyards:  PHNS, PSNS, PNSY, and NNSY.   
NAVSEA created Advanced Industrial Management – Next Generation (AIM-NG).  
Headquarters’ goal is to complete all maintenance on time or early, perform at 25 percent 
                                                 
17 Mike Boisseau, "Monthly Project Management Lean Release 2.0/3.0 Implementation Results," 
(NAVSEA, 4 October 2011), 5. 
18 Ibid. 
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less cost, and lower overtime usage to 5 to 10 percent.  An emphasis is made in AIM-NG 
on program management versus project management.  With the previous style of project 
management, individual ships would vie for attention at the shipyard and compete for 
resources.  At a critical point in the schedule, such as undocking the ship, the project 
might  overcompensate  for  resources  and  have  workers  on  standby  to  “push  through”  the  
schedule hurdle.  When doing this, other projects in the shipyard might suffer 
significantly, through less visible, schedule impacts.  Pulling off labor resources for 
contingency on the submarine scheduled to undock next week might delay a critical path 
or near critical path job on an adjacent project.  With AIM-NG, NAVSEA’s focus now is 
to balance resource allocation appropriately between all parallel projects in a shipyard, 
creating a more even-loading of resources so all projects are completed on time or 
early.19  
NAVSEA-04, the logistics, maintenance and industrial operations branch, created 
a field activity, the Navy Systems Support Group (NSSG), to develop program 
management and resource management guidelines for the shipyards. The team consisted 
of subject matter experts throughout the four shipyards:  schedulers, project 
superintendents, assistant project superintendents, resource managers, and others.  With 
NSSG’s  efforts,  NAVSEA implemented the Theory of Constraints (TOC) as developed 
by Eliyahu M. Goldratt (also  known  as  “critical  chain”).  The shipyards identified their 
system constraints as the critical chain for the availability.  For minor availabilities (less 
than 6 months in duration), the critical chain is typically 15 to 18 percent of the total 
workload.  For major availabilities (greater than 6 months in duration), the critical chain 
is typically 8 to 10 percent.20  The shipyards other five steps following the theory of 
constraints21 are: 
 
                                                 
19 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  
2009). 
20 Mike Boisseau, Phone interview, 24 Jan. 2013. 
21 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  
2009), 12. 
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1.  Identify the System Constraint  
 The Critical Chain for the Availability 
2.  Exploit the System Constraint 
 Aggressive durations with buffers for uncertainty and variability. 
Distinction between feeder buffers and overall project buffer. 
3.  Subordinate Everything Else to Above Decisions 
 The Focus:  Non-Stop Execution of the Critical Chain in Support of 
the Mechanic on the Jobsite 
 Never let the Critical Chain slow down or stop 
 Low Work in Process, No Multi-Tasking 
 Whole Team/Shipyard Focus (People, Paper, Parts, Tools, etc.) 
4.  Elevate the System Constraint 
 Increase Capacity & Focus Applied to the Critical Chain 
5.  Go Back to Step 1 
 Monitor Daily for New Constraints to the Critical Chain 
A fundamental aspect of implementing the Theory of Constraints was proper 
prioritization  “dependent  upon  an  accurate   and  up-to-date  network.”22  To conduct this 
improved resource allocation, a new scheduling tool was released in December 2006.   
The tool had a unique prioritization method meant to balance the priority among all 
projects at the shipyard.  With the new IT tool, WebAIM, each task at the yard is 
prioritized numerically (one being the top priority).  With supervisors updating the 
schedule performance daily, the software conducts a nightly critical path calculation 
among all the projects.  The priority rule set, in order of highest priority, is: 
 
                                                 
22 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  
2009), 10. 
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a. Minimum float (or slack) 
b. Tie breaker:  Earliest Start 
c. Tie breaker:  Earliest Planned Finish 










1 Buffalo Fix pump -15 1JUL 1AUG 
2 Key West Inspect Sail -14 1MAY 1DEC 
3 Chicago Install staging -14 1JUN 1DEC 
4 Chicago Flush pipe -14 1JUN 15DEC 
5 Key West Paint Tank -14 1JUN 15DEC 
Table 2.   Example Prioritization among Projects 
Using this rule set on Table 2, the number one priority of the shipyard would be to 
fix the pump on Buffalo since it has the worst float.   Float or slack, is the amount of time 
the task could be delayed without impacting the overall schedule.  By definition, anything 
with negative or zero float is thereby  on  the  critical  path.    The  Buffalo’s  task  of  fixing  the  
pump with a -15 float indicates that the overall project will be 15 days late unless this 
task is accelerated. 
The number two priority is Key West “Inspect  Sail”  since  it  is  tied  with  a  float  of 
-14, but has the earliest planned start.  The tie breaker for number three and four is 
decided in favor of “Install Staging”   since it has the earlier planned finish.  Finally, 
priorities four and five have the same float, start date, and finish date, so the tie-breaker 
implies that Chicago has an overall priority higher than Key West.  The ship priority 
comes from the customer, the submarine force command, telling the shipyard which 
boats are more important for operational reasons.  With this WebAIM tool, the Navy 
plans to better distribute resources evenly and improve schedule performance. 
                                                 
23 AIM-NG Process Manual, Chapter 6A, Execution Priorities (Washington, DC:  Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 2009). 
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The WebAIM system applies color coding based on the float values:  red is for 10 
shifts or less float, yellow is for 11 to 30 shifts of float, green is for more than 30 shifts of 
float, and blue is for level of effort (LOE) tasks.  A LOE task would include management 
resources  or  other  overhead  required  throughout  the  project’s  duration.24   
Program managers then use this prioritization to allocate resources between 
projects at each shipyard.  On the first pass of resource allocation, 100% of red and blue 
tasks are allocated.  The second pass allocates 100% resources to yellow tasks.  The final 
pass allocates remaining resources to green tasks.  Overall, the project manning is 
resourced to 80% of the total Budgeted Quantity of Work Scheduled (BQWS).  This 
helps control costs and work in process to finish the overall schedule faster.  NSSG 
studied previous shipyard availabilities and determined that historically, 20% of tasks 
were delayed due to work stoppages (e.g., procedural errors, unavailability of   tools…).  
Therefore, NSSG proposed the 80% limit for overall manning.  The intent of this multi-
pass resource allocation process is to minimize resource and schedule churn.25  
The new mantra is non-stop execution of the critical chain in support of the 
mechanic on the jobsite.  NAVSEA makes the analogy that the worker performing 
maintenance is like a surgeon:  they are the one that truly matters in the maintenance 
outcome; everyone else is in a supporting role.  One Lean initiative directed at this goal 
copied Toyota’s Andon system.  If a worker found a problem, he would no longer be 
required to stop, leave the ship, go to the engineering office, find the appropriate 
engineer, and get a procedure updated.  This stop-and-go cycle led to many delays.  
Instead, temporary phones are now placed throughout the ship so that a worker 
encountering a problem can stop, call a hotline, and a responder gets the appropriate 
engineering  and  management   support   to   the  worksite.     The  “surgeon”  no longer has to 
walk away from the operating room.26    
                                                 
24 AIM-NG Process Manual, Chapter 6A, Execution Priorities (Washington, DC:  Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 2009), 8. 




 Again, all of this effort in implementing the Theory of Constraints depends on an 
accurate schedule.  The Navy collected data to show the effect of AIM-NG 
implementation on the shipyard’s  performance.  The AIM-NG system is ranked weekly 
by an implementation score measuring nine areas.  The total score ranges from 0 to 45.  
In Figure 3 the aircraft carriers and submarines repaired at the naval shipyards are 
ordered from highest to lowest average score.  The x-axis records cost performance for 
the project while the red or green dot indicates schedule performance (as shown in the 
key).  In Earned Value Management, performing the work for exactly the expected cost 
gives a cost performance index (CPI) of 1.0.  A CPI below 1.0 indicates that the task is 
over budget, and a CPI above 1.0 indicates that the work is being performed below 
budget.  In the Naval Shipyards, they use the shortened, Cost Performance (CP), instead 
of CPI.  Each project lists the ship name, hull type, hull number, fiscal year of the 
availability start, and the type of availability.  In general, the projects following AIM-NG 
processes (with a higher implementation score) were on time or early.  Conversely, only 
2 of 20 availabilities with scores below 25 finished on time or early. In addition, the 
average days late of nearly 50 from Table 1 had fallen by 2010 to an average of only 19.6 
days.27 A significant factor in the new AIM-NG performance score relies on scheduling. 
                                                 
27 Mike Boisseau, "Monthly Project Management Lean Release 2.0/3.0 Implementation Results,"  
(NAVSEA,  4 October 2011), 5. 
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Figure 3. Lean Release Score (scaled 0 to 45) for All Aircraft Carrier 
and Submarine Repairs from 2008 to 201128  Sorted From Best 
(Left) to Worst (Right).  Green Dots Indicate On-Time Float. 
                                                 
28 Mike Boisseau, "Monthly Project Management Lean Release 2.0/3.0 Implementation Results,"  
(NAVSEA, 4 October 2011), 9. 
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. RESOURCE CONSTRAINED SCHEDULING PROBLEM (RCSP) 
1. Scheduling Problems 
A scheduling problem can be considered one of two types:  deterministic or non-
deterministic.  In a deterministic problem, the durations of each task are fixed.  A non- 
deterministic approach acknowledges the general uncertainty that most project managers 
face when predicting task durations.  Through the 1970s and 1980s, deterministic 
scheduling problems were solved using linear programming, dynamic programming, or 
branch and bound techniques.   
As Tarek Hegazy points out  “Resource  allocation  and  leveling  are  among  the  top  
challenges   in   project   management.”      His   1999   paper   used   genetic   algorithms   for  
deterministic RCSP.31  As noted by Hartmann and Briskorn in a 2010 survey, the RCSP 
“has  become  a  standard  problem  for  project  scheduling  in  the  literature.”32 The previous 
linear programming and dynamic programming techniques had solved general scheduling 
problems that were not constrained with resource limits.  With the additional constraint of 
resources considered in the scheduling problem, researchers turned to genetic algorithms 
as the heuristic of choice to achieve near-optimal solutions in a timely computational 
manner.   
One of the first solutions to the resource constrained scheduling problem (RCSP) 
under uncertainty, or non-deterministic, was in 2001 by Leu and Hung using genetic 
algorithms.33  In 2007, Lu, Lam, and Dai analyzed a RCSP with discrete event simulation 
and particle swarm optimization, a newer type of genetic algorithm.34   Particle Swarm 
                                                 
31 Tarek Hegazy, "Optimization of Resource Allocation and Leveling Using Genetic Algorithms," 
(Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 125.1:  1999), 167. 
32 Sonke Hartmann and Dirk Briskorn, "A Survey of Variants and Extensions of the Resource-
Constrained Project Scheduling Problem," (European Journal of Operational Research, 207.1:  2009), 1. 
33 Sou-Sent Leu and Tzung-Heng Hung, "A Genetic Algorithm-Based Optimal Resource-Constrained 
Scheduling Simulation Model," (Construction Management and Economics, 20.1:  2002), 132. 
34 Ming Lu, et al., "Resource-Constrained Critical Path Analysis Based on Discrete Event Simulation 
and Particle Swarm Optimization," (Automation in Construction, 17.1:  2008), 670. 
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Optimization Particle (PSO), another heuristic technique, was originally developed in 
1995 by Kennedy and Eberhart to solve single unconstrained objective optimization 
problems.  Convergence criteria were not added until 2006.   With the addition of the 
convergence criteria, PSO could then be applied to the multi-objective optimization in a 
RCSP.   
In  2011,  Gabriel  Burnett’s  dissertation  used  genetic  algorithms   to  solve  a  RCSP  
for new construction of Virginia class submarines.  He summarized how the gap between 
theory and practice often impacts academia and real-world practitioners of project 
management.  Assumptions in literature often are restrictive and oversimplify the 
problem.35  For instance, assumptions are made about the number of constraints that can 
be considered, or resources are unlimited.  Other times, the relationship between work 
hours and percent task complete is considered linear.  These simplifications transform the 
problems solved by academia into potentially oversimplified versions of problems faced 
by Project Managers. 
Burnett’s  analysis  of  new  construction  data,  versus repair,  did  “implicitly  assume  
that  processing  time  estimates  are  fairly  accurate.”36  As he states, his use of real-world 
data and resource constraints on a low-volume   problem   addressed   “an   important   real  
world problem that has not been adequately addressed in the literature.”37  This thesis 
takes another approach to that work by focusing on repair maintenance projects where the 
time estimates   are   no   longer   considered   “fairly   accurate.”  The reason that submarine 
repair schedules are more uncertain than new build schedules is that the repair work is 
conditional upon the actual state (e.g., corrosion, wear and tear, etc….)  of  equipment  that  
has already been in use.  Discovery of the extent of repair work can often only be made in 
detail once the equipment in question has been exposed and inspected. Furthermore, 
repair is often done of submarines whose nuclear reactor is operational and this imposes 
additional constraints that are not present during most phases of new construction 
                                                 
35 Gabriel Burnett, “Multiple Objective Assembly Scheduling with Spatial Resources and Recurring 
Tasks,” (Pennsylvania State University, 2011), 3. 
36 Ibid., 7. 
37 Ibid., 10. 
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projects.  The only exception is new construction nuclear powered ships who have the 
nuclear reactor operating soon before ship construction is complete. 
2. NP-Hard Problems 
As discussed in the introduction, NP-hard is a category of problems in 
computational complexity theory.  Computational complexity theory was developed in 
the 1970s for categorizing the algorithms that were increasingly executed on computers.  
Even with increased computer speed, some problems that seemed straightforward could 
still take years for a computer to solve.  A problem is NP-hard and considered inherently 
difficult  when   there  does  not  exist  an  efficient   algorithm  with  a  “number  of  operations 
that  is  polynomial  in  the  size  of  the  input  data”38   
Calculating the minimal makespan of a project is a variation of the shortest path 
problem.  Often, network analysis models would solve the dual, or find the maximum 
series of task durations before a project could be completed.  Effectively, solving this 
critical chain problem answers the shortest makespan.39  Minimizing the makespan in a 
project schedule can be considered a subset of the constrained shortest path problem, an 
identified NP-hard problem.   
Currently, the Naval Shipyards do not use any optimization techniques in 
minimizing the makespan, but rely on rules of thumb that have been established from 
prior experience.  The scheduling methods of AIM-NG are not optimization heuristics 
but short-term scheduling aids classified   in   the   literature   as   “priority   rules.”40 These 
methods avoid the complexity of the NP-hard problem but also suffer in not providing the 
level of result of an NP-hard heuristic. 
The size of the typical shipyard scheduling problem (4000 or more tasks and 7000 
or more constraints) cannot generally be solved explicitly in linear time.  Instead, using 
genetic algorithms as the heuristic to develop a near-optimal solution is a reasonable 
                                                 
38 Ravindra Ahuja, et al., Network Flows:  Theory, Algorithms, and Applications (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ:  Prentice Hall, 1993), 788. 
39 Ibid., 733. 
40 Tyson R. Browning and Ali A.  Yassine, "Resource-Constrained Multi-Project Scheduling:  Priority 
Rule  Performance  Revisited,”  (International Journal of Production Economics 1.126, 2010):  212.   
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choice. The results of the optimization will not give an absolute guarantee of global 
optimality but represent a significant improvement over current practice.  
3. Submarine Repair Difficulty 
Submarine repair schedules are some of the most complex schedules seen in 
project management.  The system complexity, the tight spaces, the nuclear reactor, the 
challenges inherent in repair, and resource competition all contribute to a dense 
integrated schedule.  Making progress in improving scheduling in submarines will aid 
project management study of other scheduling problems. 
 a. System Complexity 
 One obvious aspect of a submarine is the tremendous hardware and 
software complexity.  General Dynamic’s, Electric Boat division, is one of two shipyards 
in the United States building the new Virginia class fast attack submarine.  A case study 
on its construction practices highlighted the differences in project size with Table 3 by 
comparing a submarine to an M-1 tank and a Boeing 777 airplane. 






Weight (tons) 65 250 7800 
Length (foot) 25 200 377 
Number of Systems 25 40 200 
Crew Size 4 10 (2 pilots) 113 
Patrol Duration (hour) 24 8-14 2,000 
Number of Parts to Assemble 14,000 100,000 1,000,000 
Assembly 
(man-hours/unit) 
5,500 50,000 >10,000,000 
Production Time (months) 7.5 14 55 
Production Rate (units/year) 600 72 0.5-3 
Table 3.   Comparing Complex Systems41 
                                                 
41 The Virginia Class Submarine Program:  A Case Study, (Groton, CT:  General Dynamics Electric 
Boat, 2002), 6. 
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 Given the complexity of the system, a 20-month maintenance 
availability on a submarine can have nearly 8,000 repair tasks in the schedule.  Each task 
can range from taking one shift up to 99 shifts in duration.  Each shift is eight hours.  Not 
only are there lots of tasks, but the low rate of production in shipbuilding limits the 
implementation of many Lean and other business initiatives more easily implemented on 
assembly line construction with many repeat builds.  Nevertheless, improvements and a 
learning curve are also possible in shipyards as exemplified by the AIM-NG results 
discussed above for the 2008-2011 period. 
 b. Physical Constraints – Size of Submarine 
 As shown in Figure 4, a submarine has tight quarters and can be 
very confining for maintenance work.  Inherent in its design, many of the subsystems 
must be co-located.  For example, the aft end of the engine room, known as shaft alley, 
has the main propulsion shaft components and the hydraulic rams for the stern planes and 
rudder.  Maintenance on these systems must be sequenced carefully so that workers on 
different systems are not competing for space and   interfering  with  each  other’s  actions.  
These additional co-location constraints add another layer of difficulty in submarine 
repair.  In general, surface ships can be designed to allow for easier maintenance access 
to system components compared to submarines.42 
                                                 
42 Roy Burcher and Louis Rydill, Concepts in Submarine Design (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 131.  
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Figure 4. Troubleshooting Aboard a Los Angeles Class Fast Attack 
Submarine43 
 c. Operating Nuclear Reactor 
 All U.S. fast attack submarines since USS Providence in 1985 have 
nuclear reactors onboard that last the lifetime of the ship.44  Since the nuclear reactor 
remains operational throughout its depot maintenance, numerous subsystems must remain 
operational or have equivalent off-hull temporary systems.  Hydraulic, electrical, and air 
systems must be operational to keep the nuclear reactor safe.  Necessary maintenance 
must be conducted on one system while a backup system (permanently installed or 
temporary off-hull) provides support for the reactor.  All of the steps needed to maintain 
reactor safety add yet another layer of difficulty in conducting submarine depot 
                                                 
43 U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Steven Khor, 
<http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=135041> 
44 The United States Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, (Department of Energy, March 2009), 51. 
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maintenance.  In contrast, a conventionally powered ship would de-energize and 
depressurize systems making maintenance simpler to plan and execute because of the 
presence of only inert components and systems. 
 d. Repair vice Construction 
 Scheduling maintenance on a submarine is also inherently more 
challenging than new construction because of the many unknowns.  A common source of 
uncertainty independent of the actions of project manager is whether the maintenance 
task being performed requires more hours than originally scheduled.  For example, when 
opening and inspecting tanks onboard the submarine, it is expected that the tanks may 
require some minimal amount of abrasive blasting and painting to refurbish due to 
corrosion.  However, sometimes the existing corrosive protection system may have failed 
in the years since the tank was last opened and the work to restore the tank may grow 
from 40 hours of work to 320 hours.45   
 e. Program Management vice Project Management 
 Finally, the last challenge to submarine scheduling is due to a 
constraint at the shipyards.  The four public naval shipyards each have approximately 
three to four drydocks to perform maintenance.  At any one time, a shipyard might have a 
submarine nearing completion of its maintenance availability, a drydocked submarine a 
few weeks into a six-month availability, another submarine in drydock with 12 months 
remaining, and a final submarine in the middle of a six-month availability.  The balancing 
of these competing projects   requires   careful   coordination   between   the   shipyard’s  
operations officer and resource managers.   
B.  SCHEDULING TOOLS 
In 2006, the public shipyards conducted their first critical chain project 
management schedule on the Engineered Overhaul of the USS Montpelier in Portsmouth 
                                                 
45 Dave Brodeur, Personal interview, 1 June 2012. 
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Naval Shipyard.  For scheduling, the shipyard used Microsoft Project.  The overhaul 
schedule was broken up between seventeen individual Microsoft Project files.46 
Soon after, the four public shipyards shifted to the scheduling tool Concerto, 
which had an embedded critical chain algorithm.  However, when Concerto leveled 
workload across projects, it proved inefficient.  At the start of a schedule, nearly all 
activities were green (excessive float or slack) and over time most activities shifted to red 
priority (critical path).  This was clearly unacceptable.47   
The scheduling tool currently used by all four U.S. public naval shipyards is the 
Project Scheduling System (PSS).  The core of PSS is a program named CAT written by 
Robbins-Gioia, LLC (a project management consulting group in Alexandria, VA).   The 
PSS tool is a Government Off the Shelf (GOTS) program top-loaded onto CAT giving 
the shipyard extra abilities (e.g., naming key events and milestones, ties for testing ...).  
Each naval shipyard has a programmer on staff who maintains customized updates to the 
program.  Currently, Robbins-Gioia is developing Jaguar, a web-based client server 
scheduling tool similar to PSS.  The U.S. Navy has not made a commitment to shift tools 
considering the existing overhead and commitment to PSS.48  
In the PSS software the  only  automatic  scheduling   is  a  “resource”  button which 
automatically schedules tasks and aligns them with the resource plan.  The AIM-NG 
manual prohibits using this function as the shipyards have assessed that the tool does not 
properly match schedule constraints.  Generally, when executing this function, too many 
tasks are pushed to the left and the proposed schedule is unfeasible.  Instead, PSS is used 
to track the current schedule; it uses no heuristics or optimization methods.49  
While the resource leveling tool in PSS is the right approach, there are a number 
of reasons the current system can fail.  The projected workload does not include new 
work, even if it is expected.  Also, it assumes a 1.0 Cost Performance, where a CP of less 
                                                 





than 1.0 would require additional resources not accounted for.  It also shows resource 
needs and availability (i.e., resource pools) for inside shop work and not just the 
particular project.  Every night at the shipyards, PSS interacts with the WebAIM tool by 
taking a forward pass and backward pass through all project schedules and determining 
the critical path of each project.  The forward pass determines early start and early finish 
dates.  The backward pass determines late start and late finish dates.  Then, the WebAIM 
tool can prioritize each task by calculating float or slack as discussed in Chapter I, section 
A.4.50   
Meanwhile, Electric Boat, a new construction submarine shipyard, uses Artemis.  
Artemis is a larger enterprise software solution that includes investment, asset manager, 
and other company operations besides project management.  Electric Boat has not 
dedicated IT resources to develop and maintain a customized scheduling tool such as 
PSS.51    
In 2011, the U.S. Navy began preliminary planning to shift their scheduling tool 
to Primavera.  This tool, owned by Oracle, is one of the premier commercial scheduling 
tools.      Projects   that   used   Primavera   include   Boston’s   Big   Dig   and   Kuala   Lumpur’s  
Petronas towers.  However, current U.S. Navy testing with Primavera has shown 
significant issues when attempting to process a submarine Engineered Overhaul schedule.  
Many of these issues have been the difficulty with the enterprise solution of shifting from 
PSS to a new system that requires changing interfaces with other programs.  Any method 
that builds upon PSS would eliminate these transition issues.52  
C.   OPTIMIZATION IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
To minimize the makespan, the project manager can either accelerate the 
individual task durations, or change the ties in the network to reduce the length.  Task 
durations can often be reduced by adding additional personnel.  However, some tasks do 
not have a linear relationship between the number of workers assigned and the resulting 
                                                 
50 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July  
2009). 
51 Dave Brodeur, Personal interview, 1 June 2012. 
52 Ibid. 
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task duration.  For instance, in a small space, an additional worker may not be able to 
help paint.  The work duration cannot be reduced any further.  Sometimes, physical 
processes such as paint curing or welding require a set amount of time.  Additional 
workers cannot reduce these durations either.  A full optimization of a schedule to reduce 
the makespan would need such details for each individual task. 
In practice, shipyard managers re-allocate resources to each project on a periodic 
basis.  At the U.S. public naval shipyards there is a weekly resource allocation meeting.  
Each program manager uses their updated schedule to petition for different resources.  
The shipyard operations officer and resource manager make the final decision on 
allocating resources for the next week.53  Often, additional resources are requested to 
reduce the duration of ongoing tasks.  Optimizing the resource allocation to reduce the 
overall makespan is a NP-hard problem. 
D. FLAW OF AVERAGES 
In 2000, Sam   Savage,   from   Stanford   University,   coined   the   term   “flaw   of  
averages”   to   emphasize   the   common   misunderstanding   of   risk   under   uncertainty.    
Managers often make decisions under uncertainty with the flawed assumption that 
averaging a large amount of inputs will result in an average outcome.  As de Neufville 
and  Scholtes  state,  “it  is  not  correct  to  calculate  the  average  value  of  a  project  based  on  its  
performance   under   average   conditions.”54  This is exactly the temptation that project 
managers face when dealing with point estimates in the traditional critical path method.   
Currently, at U.S. Naval shipyards, each trade supervisor (e.g., electrician or 
welder supervisor) conducts a job summary review for all tasks under their purview.  
This takes place up to six months before the availability start.  Depending on the task 
complexity, a team reviewing a task could include engineers, supervisors, shop foreman 
and other process owners.  The team reviews past projects, recent improvements or 
problems related to the task, and then develop an estimate for the task duration.  
                                                 
53 Requirement for Management of Workforce Resources in Naval Shipyards.  NAVSEAINST 
4850.11 (Washington, D.C.:  Naval Sea Systems Command, 15 January 2010), 5. 
54 Richard de Neufville and Stefan Scholtes, Flexibility in Engineering Design, (Cambridge, MA:   
2011), 17. 
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Although a range of durations is discussed, the only option that the supervisor has is to 
provide a point estimate of the duration to build the schedule.   
The flaw of averages is evidenced when the project managers then build a 
schedule from thousands of point estimates and must ignore the underlying uncertainty in 
each task.  It is assumed that the variability will “average  out”  and  buffers  are  inserted  to  
account for the risk of uncertainty.  The tasks within the schedule are not independent 
when considering the overall makespan.  Each of the tasks can come from many 
nonlinear, often discontinuous functions.  This is the subject of Sam  Savage’s   flaw   of  
averages.  Using  simulation  can  account  for  the  nonlinear  nature  of  the  project’s  duration  
impacted by the uncertain task durations that compose the project network. 
E. IMPACT OF SCHEDULING 
 Overall, the literature in project management is clear that scheduling is crucial.  
For naval shipyard projects, it is estimated that over 70 percent of project costs are labor 
related.  Much of this labor expense is tied to scheduling.  Therefore, poor scheduling of 
resources can waste the primary resource and expense of the project.55  Meanwhile, First 
Marine International, a British shipbuilding consultant firm, concluded in a 2005 study 
that  “planning  and  scheduling  are  weak  points  in  the  U.S.  shipbuilding  industry.”56  
 Giving project managers direct access to the scheduling tools to conduct what-if 
analysis and an increased level of understanding is a common point of discussion in the 
project management literature.57  However, a 2004 survey of 735 project management 
personnel showed that over 60% did not use software for simulation or scenario 
analysis.58  Given the large scope of work for shipyards however, the option should not 
be overlooked. 
                                                 
55 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:  9 July 
2009). 
56 First Marine International Findings for the Global Benchmarking Industrial Base Benchmarking 
Study, Part 1:  Major Shipyards, (London:  First Marine International, August 2005), 20. 
57 Gabriel Burnett, “Multiple Objective Assembly Scheduling with Spatial Resources and Recurring 
Tasks,” (Pennsylvania State University, 2011), 31. 
58 Claude  Besner  and  Brian  Hobbs,  “An Empirical Investigation of Project Management Practice:  In 
Reality, Which Tools do Practitioners Use?”  (University  of  Quebec, 2004), 4. 
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 In 2010, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard executed an Engineered Overhaul (EOH) 
on the USS Chicago.  This overhaul was executed with the new scheduling functionality 
of WebAIM and the AIM-NG process.  As shown in Figure 5, the   Chicago   project’s  
improvements in cost performance compared to previous overhauls of equivalent vessels 
was the equivalent of over 21,400 resource-days.  This is nearly 10% of the overall 
project manning that had a baseline schedule of 240,000 resource-days. 
 
Figure 5. USS  Chicago’s  Cost  Performance  (CP) Improvements by 
using AIM-NG Processes and Improved Scheduling59 
F. SUMMARY 
Overall, the literature review showed that RCSP is applicable to U.S. Naval 
shipyards.  The shipyards are certainly resource constrained.  Also, submarine repair 
offers multiple unique challenges making it a difficult case for project management 
scheduling.  The current methods at the shipyards rely on process rule prioritization vice 
optimization techniques.  Also, point estimates for duration are relied upon to build the 
                                                 
59 Mike Boisseau, "Monthly Project Management Lean Release 2.0/3.0 Implementation Results,"  
(NAVSEA, 4 October 2011), 12. 
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project network and buffers are used to assume the risk of the uncertainty.  Instead, this 
thesis proposes simulation and optimization techniques to account for the uncertainty and 
solve the RCSP using a heuristic genetic algorithm (GA) that can handle realistic 
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III.   DATA SET 
A.   DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data set provided as a basis for this research is a notional submarine overhaul 
schedule.  The data is notional since full submarine maintenance availability information 
would indicate expected lifetime of the equipment.  The data was created by NAVSEA to 
give industry a sample data set to test future developments in scheduling software.  
Specifically, NAVSEA provided this data set to test Oracle’s  Primavera  software.60  The 
MIT PIE study continues to seek data for new construction naval shipyards.  At the time 
of publishing, this data was unavailable for comparison. 
The data set includes 4038 individual tasks and 7723 constraints or ties.  The 
tasks durations are measured in units of shifts where a shift is equal to an eight-hour work 
day.  The maximum number of shifts that the four public shipyards use is 99 since the 
current software limits entry to two-digits.  The Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of the 
notional data has longer task durations to adjust the overall project schedule duration to 
match a real data set.  The notional data set does not include the nuclear-related tasks.61   
The  data’s 7723 ties are either strategic or technical ties.  A technical tie is made 
between jobs when task X must be completed prior to task Y starting.  For example, 
inspection of a tank has a technical tie to the task of opening the tank.  In contrast, a 
strategic tie is not required but has other strategic rationale:  perhaps part of a strategy or 
to sequence work.  For example, two systems co-located in the same small area on a 
submarine may have strategic constraints set to finish work on the first system before 
starting work on the second adjacent system.62  For the 7723 constraints in the data, some 
are assumed to be strategic while others are technical.  However, the data does not clearly 
differentiate the type.  In a working schedule, this information would be available by 
questioning the supervisors. 
                                                 
60 Dave Brodeur, Personal interview, 1 June 2012. 
61 Ibid. 
62 AIM-NG Process Manual, Chapter 6A, Execution Priorities (Washington, DC:  Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 2009), 13. 
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B.   FORMATTING DATA 
The  date  provided  by  the  Navy  is  written  as  a  “*.csv”  or  comma  separated  value  
file saved to Microsoft Excel.  This is the format exported by the current Navy scheduling 
tool, Project Scheduling System (PSS).  The data was successfully loaded into both the 
Microsoft Project 2010 and 2013 versions.  Details of importing the data and properly 
formatting it with Microsoft Project are listed in Appendix A.  
C.   DATA ASSESSMENT 
The data set was initially assessed using the @Risk audit tool.  The three “error”  
types identified were:  1) No successor tasks, 2) No predecessor tasks, and 3) Tasks out 
of   sequence.      For   the   no   successors   or   no   predecessors,   these   “errors”   are   generally  
allowed   in   accordance  with   the   shipyard’s  AIM-NG instruction.  For no predecessors, 
AIM-NG  requires   that  such   tasks  with  “planned  starts”  be   limited   to  no  more   than  five  
percent of the total number of tasks.63  However, the tasks out of sequence errors also 
violated the process rules in AIM-NG.  These errors were corrected in two ways.  First, if 
a task had multiple predecessors that were valid, the predecessor that was out of sequence 
was deleted.  Second, if the only predecessors listed were out of sequence, then a new 
predecessor was identified that was in sequence and was consistent with the task 
description.  The audit results are included in Appendix B. 
D.   NAMING STRUCTURE 
The description of each task includes a job order code used by the four public 
shipyards as shown in Figure 6.  In the notional data set, the project is designated as 
“BAT.”     The   Job  Order   number   comes from the work summary that is reviewed by a 
relevant supervisor during the planning phase when the initial duration is estimated.  The 
“Key   op”   entry   is   the   Key   Operation   done   in   the   task   for   a   specific   “cuphase”   or  
Component  Unit  phase.    For  instance,  “H”  would  indicate  off  ship  repair. 
                                                 
63 AIM-NG Process Manual, Chapter 6A, Execution Priorities (Washington, DC:  Naval Sea Systems 
Command, 2009), 23. 
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Figure 6. NAVSEA Job Order Structure64 Provides Unique Task ID 
The other code used in task descriptions is the Key Event or Milestone 
description.  These are fully listed in the appendices of the NAVSEA Baseline Project 
Management Plan, instruction NAVSEAINST 4790.23.  For  instance  SA00  is  the  “Start  
of  the  Availability”  while  CA00  is  the  “Completion  of  the  Availability.”65 
For resources, the data includes two-digit shop descriptions.  The public shipyards 
shop numbering evolved over time and have no clear logical pattern.  A summary of the 
shop system for PHNSY is included in Table 4.  Other naval shipyards may have slightly 
differing organizations.  Of note, even though a welder may be identified in X26, there 
exist specific Trade Skill Designators (TSDs) that further differentiate the skill sets 
within each shop.  For instance, a welder may be qualified for different types of welds 
                                                 
64 Mike  Boisseau,  “Lean  Release,”  Project  Management  Fundamentals  (Pearl  Harbor,  HI:    9  July 
2009). 
65 Baseline AIM Process Manual, Version C (Washington, D.C.:  Naval Sea Systems Command, 
1997), E1-E9. 
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(e.g., TIG or MIG) and that TSD will be listed in the job summary description for the 
individual task. 
Shop Code Description 
C900 Production Department 2 Structural Sho s (Shops 11, 17, 26) 
     X11 Shipfitter 
     X17 Sheet metal 
     X26 Welders 
C930 Mechanical Shops (Shops 31, 38, 41) 
     X31 Inside Machine Shop 
     X38 Marine Machinery Mechanical 
     X38M6 Marine Machinery Mechanical - Hydraulics 
     X41 Boilermaker 
C950 Electrical (Shops 51, 52, 67) 
     X51 Electrical 
     X52 Calibration Lab 
    X67 Electronics Shop 
C960 Pipe and Temporary Ship Systems (Shops 06, 56, 99) 
    X06 Tool Room 
    X56  Pipefitting and Refrigeration 
    X99 Temporary Services 
C970 Service Shops (64, 71, 72) 
    X64 Shipwrights 
    X71 Painters 
    X72 Non-Nuclear Cleaners 
C700 Lifting and Handling Department (Shop 98) 
     X98 Riggers (crane support) 
     C760 Divers 
Table 4.   Code (C) and Shop (X) Descriptions  
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IV.   ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATION 
A.   ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
To maximize the chance that results could be used at a shipyard, the analysis tool 
was chosen from a readily-available software package.  A more academic tool, or 
computer code analysis package, would likely be relegated to obscurity for shipyard 
implementation.  The tools chosen were   “@Risk”   and   “Evolver,”   both   included   in   a 
software package available from Palisade software.  The software is an add-on to 
Microsoft Excel and can also interface directly with Microsoft Project.  The current 
shipyard scheduling tool, PSS, already has export features (*.csv format discussed in 
Chapter III), that make it readily compatible with Microsoft Project, and hence @Risk. 
1. @Risk 
The @Risk software package is built around Monte Carlo simulations executed in 
Microsoft Excel.  When executing simulations with project data, the program 
synchronizes data between Microsoft Project and Excel.  The @Risk software includes a 
selection of probability distributions and sensitivity analysis options.  A key aspect of 
selecting the @Risk software was to ensure implementation ease at the public naval 
shipyards.  This software has been on the market since the 1980s and has been frequently 
updated.  It includes expansive examples, instruction details, and online help.  Another 
algorithm may not be easily executable by the public shipyards or have the established 
support of @Risk. 
2. Evolver 
Evolver is another add-on to Excel that uses genetic algorithms, Tabu search, 
neural networks, linear programming and integer programming to solve optimization 
problems. Developed in 1990, it was the first genetic algorithm software commercially 
available.  It currently comes with the optional Decision Tools Suite for @Risk.68   
                                                 
68 http://www.palisade.com/evolver/ 
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Genetic algorithms are a common heuristic chosen to solve NP-hard resource constrained 
scheduling problems. 
B.   ALGORITHM EXECUTION 
1.   Varying Each Task Duration 
 The first experiment executed was to vary the duration of each task by plus or 
minus 10 percent.   Currently, the naval shipyards use point estimates for the duration of 
every task in the schedule.  During the planning stage when supervisors conduct job 
summary reviews, the supervisors often have a range estimate for the task duration.  This 
simulation was meant to simply model this level of individual task variation.   
 Using   the   “Parameter   Entry   Table”   option   within  @Risk,   the   4038   tasks   were  
each assigned a triangle distribution.  The triangle distribution was chosen for its 
simplicity and ease of defining parameters.  This is anticipation of future implementation 
at the naval shipyards.  Supervisors could likely assign the minimum, maximum, and 
most likely duration.  More advanced probability distributions are beyond the training 
and background of most shipyards supervisors and managers.  For this reason, it is often 
used as an initial distribution in project management simulations. 
For the triangle distribution, the minimum was assigned as minus 10 percent of 
the point estimate duration and the maximum being plus 10 percent.  Then the overall 
project was simulated with 100 iterations.  The project finish date was assigned as the 
@Risk output.  Results of this experiment are shown in Chapter V. 
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Figure 7. Accessing the Parameter Entry Table in @Risk 
 
Figure 8. Modifying Durations in the @Risk Parameter Entry Table  
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2.   Variation on Critical Path 
The next experiment executed was to vary the estimated duration of key tasks in 
the critical path.  While the first analysis took a general 10% variability to all of the tasks 
estimated durations, the shipyard typically has more detailed data of specific critical 
tasks.  For instance, repairing the main ballast tanks of a submarine is often on the critical 
path of a submarine repair plan.  Simply, the drydock cannot be flooded until this work is 
complete.  Therefore, the shipyards have detailed histories on the variability of the tasks 
related to inspecting, sand blasting, repairing, and painting of the main ballast tank 
system.   
This analysis step shows how variability of key tasks (while holding other task 
durations as constant), still has a significant impact on the overall schedule.  Often, this 
variability is unknown and cannot be forecasted.  For instance, the physical condition of a 
main ballast tank can only be estimated until an inspector first enters the tank.   
Specifically, in @Risk, the top 10 task durations that affected the finish date from 
the simulation in Section B.1 were then confirmed in the critical path.  These durations 
were then adjusted to Triangle distributions with the minimum being minus 20 percent of 
the point estimate duration and the maximum being plus 20 percent.  Then the overall 
project was simulated with 100 iterations.  The remaining 4028 tasks had their durations 
fixed at the original point estimate.   
This simulation demonstrates a more realistic project management problem where 
specific tasks may have detailed estimates of variation in task duration while only point 
estimates may be available for other tasks.  For instance, a shipyard knows how long 
blasting and painting ballast tanks has taken on the last few projects since it commonly 
falls on the critical path.  The project finish date was assigned as the @Risk output.  
Results are discussed in Chapter V. 
3.   Optimizing Resource Allocation to Minimize the Makespan 
 To simulate the  shipyard’s  weekly  resource  allocation, a portion of the schedule 
was selected to represent one-week of data to test.  The @Risk and Evolver software 
were used to optimize resource allocation to minimize the makespan.  The baseline for 
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this model  was  the  “Scheduling Job Tasks on Machines with  Uncertainty” example file 
provided with @Risk.  The file provided a template for the simulation that the submarine 
data could be easily inserted into.  Data output analyzed included the primary objective 
function to minimize the makespan (in 8-hour shifts).  Other output analyzed included the 
total shop idle time (in 8-hour shifts), the number of workers, and the total task time (in 
man hours).   
The assumptions made in this model include: 
 Duration of each job task follows a normal distribution with standard 
deviation as a percentage of the mean.  The mean was set as the estimated 
task duration (used in the fixed model).  The standard deviation was taken 
as 20% of the mean.      
 Task duration varies linearly with the number of workers assigned to the 
task.  For instance if the task takes 40 hours, it would be completed in 20 
hours if two workers are assigned. 
 Work is blocked in 8-hour shifts so that hours are rounded to the number 
of shifts.  For instance, a 6-hour job is considered 1-shift. 
The decision rule implemented in the simulation was a simplified rule that 
matches a common management decision.  Since most workers are scheduled for 
Monday-Friday, one shift a day, then a 5-shift, or 40-hour, job should take a worker one 
week.  Therefore, additional workers are added to any job scheduled over 40-hours to 
keep the task completion time within one work week.  If the job is between 120 and 160 
hours, four total workers were assigned.  If between 80 and 120 hours, three total workers 
were assigned.  If the job was between 40 hours to 80 hours, two total workers were 
assigned.  Only if the job was less than 40 hours was only one worker assigned.   
There were a total of 25 tasks with five different worker types.  The number of 
tasks was divided evenly so that each worker type needed to do five tasks.  The five 
worker types included:  Welder (shop 26), Electrician (shop 51), Mechanic (shop 38), 
Inside Machine Shop (shop 31), and Shipwright (shop 64).  For the sample data, the mean 
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task time estimate (in man hours) varied from 2 to 99.  The task duration was rounded to 
eight-hour shifts as well for some data calculations. 
Table 5 shows the 25 tasks mapped to the five worker types.  The fourth column, 
“Mean   task   time  estimate  (man hours)”   represented  no  additional  management  decision  
to allocate additional resources.  This was considered  the  “fixed  design.”    In comparison, 
the   fifth   column,   “Actual   task   time   (man hours)”   was   used   for   additional   resource  
allocation.  This actual time was taken as a normal distribution centered on the estimate 
with a standard deviation of 20% of the mean.  Allocating additional workers was 
considered   the   “flexible   design.”      The   sixth   column,   “#  Workers,”   was   set   so   that   an  
additional worker was assigned for every 40 hours of work.  This matches a short-cut 
planning approach that could be implemented where managers try to keep the task 
duration within one week of completion.  For example, a 75-hour job could be completed 




Table 5.   Task IDs Mapped to Five Worker Types for Smaller Experiment with 25 
Tasks and Uncertain Task Durations 
For the full data set of 4038 tasks, more detailed knowledge would be needed since 
many tasks durations cannot simply be compressed by adding more personnel. The 
simulation on the 25 tasks was run with 1000 iterations.  This simulation uses the Evolver 





















1 1 1 64 64.00 2 32 4.00
2 1 2 32 32.00 1 32 4.00
3 1 3 29 29.00 1 29 4.00
4 1 4 32 32.00 1 32 4.00
5 1 5 48 48.00 2 24 3.00
6 2 1 6 6.00 1 6 1.00
7 2 2 72 72.00 2 36 5.00
8 2 3 24 24.00 1 24 3.00
9 2 4 7 7.00 1 7 1.00
10 2 5 11 11.00 1 11 2.00
11 3 1 14 14.00 1 14 2.00
12 3 2 10 10.00 1 10 2.00
13 3 3 18 18.00 1 18 3.00
14 3 4 2 2.00 1 2 1.00
15 3 5 88 88.00 3 29 4.00
16 4 1 36 36.00 1 36 5.00
17 4 2 22 22.00 1 22 3.00
18 4 3 99 99.00 3 33 5.00
19 4 4 74 74.00 2 37 5.00
20 4 5 12 12.00 1 12 2.00
21 5 1 77 77.00 2 39 5.00
22 5 2 44 44.00 2 22 3.00
23 5 3 15 15.00 1 15 2.00
24 5 4 10 10.00 1 10 2.00
25 5 5 70 70.00 2 35 5.00
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C. SUMMARY 
The algorithms chosen on the data can all be implemented relatively easily with 
little additional software than the naval shipyards currently use.  The shipyard’s  PSS tool 
has the capability to export data into comma separated value (*.csv) format which can 
then be loaded into Microsoft Excel and then Microsoft Power Point.  The @Risk 
software package from Palisade software is an add-on to Excel and with the latest release, 
version 6.1, it synchronizes directly with Project.   
The first experiment chosen was to vary all 4038 tasks by plus or minus ten 
percent duration (with a triangle distribution).  Almost every task in a submarine overhaul 
has some variability in the duration.  Ten percent was chosen since it is a simple 
representation of an average expected variability across all tasks.  However, a more 
detailed data set might reveal that some tasks have much wider variability, twenty percent 
or more.   
The second experiment was run on ten crucial tasks that have high impact on the 
overall makespan.  These tasks were simulated with variability (a triangle distribution) of 
plus or minus twenty percent.  This larger variability was chosen to represent the more 
likely variability seen on some of the more challenging critical path tasks in a submarine 
overhaul.  The complexity of some of these more crucial tasks typically have wider 
variability for some of the reasons listed in Chapter II, section 3.   
The final experiment was an optimization of the RCSP for a subset of the data, 25 
tasks.  Again, all 4038 tasks have individualized relationships between resources and 
duration.  Often, more workers would not be able to necessarily   speed   up   a   task’s  
duration.  The data set would have to include much more robust information to properly 
model the RCSP for the entire project makespan.  With the level of information currently 
in the data set, the amount of assumptions necessary to optimize the entire schedule 




V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A. ALGORITHM ANALYSIS 
1.  Varying Each Task Duration 
 After  assigning  a  triangle  distribution  to  each  task’s  duration  of  plus  or  minus  10  
percent, the @Risk simulation was run with 100 iterations.  With the original point 
estimates  for  each  task’s  duration,  the  overall  project  was  scheduled  for  640  days  with  a 
start date of 3/1/2011 and finish date of 8/12/2013.  The output of the @Risk simulation 
is shown in Figure 9 and Table 6.    
  
Figure 9. Probability Versus Finish Date When Varying Individual 
Task Duration by +/- 10% 
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 Date Duration  (Start of 3/1/2011) 
Original Finish (without simulation) 8/12/2013 640 
Minimum (with simulation) 7/26/2013 628 
Mean (with simulation) 8/13/2013 641 
Maximum (with simulation) 8/29/2013 653 
Mode (with simulation) 8/9/2013 639 
Median 8/13/2013 643 
Standard Deviation 6.485 Days 
 
Table 6.   Finish Date Statistics When Varying Individual Task Duration by +/- 10% 
The data results for varying the task duration demonstrate the nonlinearity warned 
against in the flaw of averages discussed in Chapter II, section D.  Even though the 
overall duration is 640 days, the finish date varies only 37 days, or +/- 2.9 percent, with a 
standard deviation of 6.5 days.  While input durations varied by 10 percent, the overall 
duration varied by only 2.9 percent. At first glance, this seems somewhat surprising. 
These results match predictions of the Central Limit Theorem (CLT).  According 
to the CLT, the distribution of the sample mean approaches a normal distribution as the 
sample size increases.  The original population, the baseline schedule, had a population 
mean, µ equal to 640 days.  In accordance with the CLT, the mean of the sample (the 100 
iterations of the simulation) would have a mean of µ (result was actually 641 days vice 
640 days in the population).   
Although the overall makespan was only +/- 2.9 percent while the inputs varied 
by 10 percent, the results do not contradict the CLT.  The CLT assumes independent 
random variables and the network provides multiple dependencies for the tasks.  For 
instance, if the network only consisted of ten sequential tasks, then the upper bound on 
the overall makespan would be plus 10 percent.  However, as soon as multiple near 
critical paths exist, then the overall makespan upper bound is lowered.   
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An additional feature of @Risk is the sensitivity analysis using tornado graphs 
from  the  simulation’s  inputs.    The @Risk simulation shows the top 10 tasks that affected 
the mean finish date as shown in Figure 10.  In Figures 11 and 12, the input tasks effects 
on the finish date are ranked by regression coefficient and correlation coefficient.  This 
analysis would assist a project team in examining durations and plans for these key tasks.  
The @Risk default lists tasks in Figures 10 through 12 in order (top to bottom) from most 
impact to least impact on the objective function (i.e., makespan).  The three graphs 
effectively represent three models of how the tasks affect the impact:  direct network ties 
(Figure 10), a regression model (Figure 11), or Spearman rank of correlation (Figure 12).  
The figures display three separate common statistical models for correlating the inputs 
(i.e., tasks) to the output makespan. 
  Essentially, these tasks are not only on the critical path, but they also have 
significant impact due to their ties in the broader network.  They act as chokepoints 
where prolonged duration for their completion has large impacts throughout the schedule.  
This sensitivity analysis is a valuable tool in identifying these types of tasks.  With this 
information identified in the planning stage, a project manager could task a further 
analysis to explore shortening the makespan.  For instance, is one of the tasks identified 
overburdened with successors?  Is there a way to re-tie the network to reduce the 
chokepoint effect of this task?  Again, some of the constraints are technical (i.e., task A 
must be completed before task B), but some are strategic (i.e., best strategy is to work 
system A before system B).  Strategic constraints could be more readily altered to reduce 
the impact of identified chokepoint tasks.  Or, if additional resources (personnel or 
specialized equipment) could be applied to reduce the duration, then these tasks likely 
have the greatest return on investment. 
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Figure 10. @Risk Tornado Diagram:  Input Tasks with Greatest Effect 
on Output (Finish Date) Mean 
 
Figure 11. @Risk Tornado Diagram:  Input Tasks with Largest 
Regression Coefficients Impacting the Output (Finish Date)  
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Figure 12. @Risk Tornado Diagram:  Input Tasks with Largest 
Correlation Coefficients Impacting the Output (Finish Date) 
2. Variation on Critical Path 
Just as in the previous simulation, the overall project was scheduled for 640 days 
with a start date of 3/1/2011 and finish date of 8/12/2013.  Now, instead of varying the 
duration estimates for all 4038 tasks, only 10 tasks on the critical path had their duration 
varied.  These  10   tasks  were   identified   in   the  previous  simulation’s   sensitivity   analysis  
from Figure 10.  Again, each of these 10 tasks was assigned a triangle distribution to the 
duration of plus or minus 20 percent, twice the amount of uncertainty as compared to the 
prior analysis.  The output of the @Risk simulation is shown in Figure 13 and Table 7.   
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Figure 13. Probability Versus Finish Date When Varying Individual 
Task Duration by +/- 20% Only for the Top 10 Tasks 
 
Table 7.   Finish Date Statistics when Varying Duration of the Top 10 Critical Tasks 
by +/-20% 
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While varying the duration for all tasks by 10 percent resulted in a finish date 
range of 37 days, varying just 10 critical tasks by 20 percent resulted in a range of 35 
days.  Again, the other 4028 tasks were kept with fixed durations in this case.  The 
standard deviation in the previous simulation was 6.5 days while it is now 6.8 days.  This 
similar output with variation on only 10 critical tasks compared to 4038 tasks shows the 
importance of project management on the critical chain.  
3.  Optimizing Resource Allocation to Minimize the Makespan 
In this experiment, the simulation is only done on a small portion of the much 
larger network seen in actual submarine maintenance.  The analyzed simulation only 
covers 25 tasks.  However, this simulation demonstrates analysis that could be carried out 
on individual portions of the schedule, such as weekly lists or critical path tasks.   
The overall schedule could be similarly analyzed if there was data justifying 
reducing every task duration linearly with worker resources.  However, many task’s 
durations are fixed (e.g., 7 days for paint to cure…).    Also,  many  tasks  on  a  submarine  
suffer from physical constraints (discussed in Chapter II, section A.3.b.) where multiple 
workers just cannot fit in the confined workspace. 
The simulation captures in simplified form the decision by shipyard management 
to more closely track the actual duration of tasks and to adjust workers accordingly.  The 
savings in the makespan will be a measure of the input variables (the higher the 
variability in duration, the more likely the difference in duration between the fixed and 
flexible designs of resource allocation).   
a.   Evaluation of the Cumulative Distribution Function 
The cumulative distribution function for shifts required to complete the 
sample of 25 tasks is shown in Figure 14 and Table 8.  The result is discrete and looks 
like a staircase as opposed to a smooth curve since the unit of measure is number of 
shifts.  As shown, the flexible resource allocation design (in red) is stochastically 
dominant since the objective function is to minimize the time required.  In other words, 
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the flexible resource allocation design has a shorter makespan in all cases.  This is 
expected in the case of adding additional resources. 
 
Figure 14. Cumulative Probability Distribution:  Comparison of Time 





Table 8.   Cumulative Probability Distribution Statistics:  Comparison of Time 
Required (Blue is Fixed Design, Red is Flexible Resource Allocation 
Design) 
With 1000 trials in the simulation, the flexible resource allocation design (in red) 
had a mean makespan of 34.5 shifts versus 36.5 shifts for the fixed design.  This was a 
savings in overall time of 5.5%.  The minimum was 27 shifts for the flexible design 
compared to 32 shifts for the fixed design, an improvement of 15.6%.   
b. Evaluation of Multiple Criteria 
As can be seen in Table 9, the flexible design has a clear advantage in the 
primary objective function of minimizing the number of shifts to complete the work.  
Also, it reduces the idle time in the shop.  Graphs of makespan, shop idle time, number of 
workers, and overall task time (in man hours) are shown in Appendix C for both the fixed 
and flexible resource allocation designs.  However, more workers (36 versus 43) is 
required to achieve this flexibility.  This would be balanced by data on the actual resource 
constraints available at a public shipyard.  As opposed to private shipyards that may have 
larger personnel swings, the public shipyards have a more steady personnel level.  
Flexibility with manning may be more likely at a private shipyard for surge capacity.  





 Fixed Design Flexible Resource 
Allocation Design 
Minimum Time Required (shifts) 32 27 
Average Time Required (shifts) 36.502 34.518 
Max. Time Required (shifts) 42 41 
Time Required, P5 34 31 
Time Required, P95 39 38 
Average Shop Idle Time 102.012 93.787 
Average Number of Workers 36 (Constant) 43 
Table 9.   Results with Multiple Criteria, Fixed versus Flexible Design 
Again, since the actual work schedule has 4,038 tasks, the model described in this 
section is a first-step simplification.  This model could be applied to select portions of the 
schedule network, such as the critical path or to weekly periods of work.  Other model 
adjustments to increase fidelity would be to adjust the number of tasks, match the number 
of actual trade skill worker categories to the shipyard manning (around 30 different trade 
skills), or adjust the decision rules.  A more complex model would require details for the 
data  set   that  would  include  more  than  the  given  task’s  job  order  code and nominal task 
duration.    A  task’s  work  summary  sheet  for  each  task  would  be  needed  to  ensure  resource  
allocation decisions in the optimization would have the desired effect.   
B. OVERALL RESULTS 
As discussed in Chapter II, Section D, the data shows how the project system is 
nonlinear.  A variation in 10 percent of all individual task durations resulted in a finish 
date duration of only plus or minus 2.9 percent.  Varying just the top 10 critical tasks by 
20 percent resulted in a finish date duration of plus or minus 2.7 percent.   
The experiment on optimizing resource allocation to minimize the makespan 
showed an improvement versus the fixed resource allocation design.  Unfortunately, this 
method cannot be carried out on all 4038 tasks since adding additional resources does not 
necessarily result in a linear reduction in the duration.  Again, a more detailed data set 
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would be needed that includes task descriptions.  In the pubic shipyards, this is generally 
part of the Availability Work Package.  However, the trial experiment demonstrates the 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A.   PIE STUDY IMPACT 
This thesis shows that existing commercial off the shelf tools can have an impact 
to better understand the complex dynamics of schedules in ship repair.  The specific 
application to U.S. public shipyards described below has relevance to the RCSP and 
project management. 
B. APPLICABILITY 
1.   Applicability to U.S. Public Shipyards 
Clearly, the results of this study are applicable to the four public U.S. Naval 
Shipyards.  The use of @Risk with Microsoft Project offers a new capability for project 
managers to evaluate the variability of their schedules.  As discussed in Chapter II, 
Section B, seven years ago the shipyard required 17 individual files within Microsoft 
Project to capture one maintenance project.  This thesis demonstrated that Microsoft 
Project 2010 can accommodate the data set the Navy provided to test the Primavera 
software. 
For maintenance availabilities longer than six months in duration, the project 
manager and scheduler are assigned to the project one year in advance to begin planning.  
Other project members begin staffing the project six months before the start of the 
availability.  During this time, the use of @Risk or similar software would prove valuable 
for the project team in understanding the dynamics of the project schedule.  Currently, the 
project schedule is made of thousands of point-estimates for the duration of individual 
tasks.  With probabilistic scheduling tools, the project team could better plan for the 
possible schedule outcomes.   
The sensitivity analysis demonstrated with tornado diagrams shows how crucial 
tasks can be identified that have large impact on the overall project duration.  Most 
project management practices focus on the critical path.  However, with the large scale 
and duration in submarine maintenance projects, the critical path or near-critical path can 
consist of thousands of tasks.  Merely identifying the critical path may not provide 
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managers   the   ability   to   “focus”   on   thousands   of   items.      Instead,   tornado   diagrams  
generated in planning could identify tasks that are not only on the critical path but are 
particularly crucial due to their ties within the network.  Simulation can help identify 
these chokepoints to allow project management focus and action.   
The Navy’s analysis of Primavera, offered some “tangible  benefits”  to shifting to 
a commercial scheduling tool.  Many of the benefits repeated below would apply equally 
to use of @Risk and Microsoft Project for scheduling submarine maintenance 
availabilities:69    
 A single repository for Business Unit programs 
 All programs in the system present data in a consistent format making 
analysis easier 
 The tracking of program attributes and visibility of summary data will 
provide additional ways for executives and other managers to analyze the 
portfolio   of   each   Business   Unit’s   programs,   thereby   increasing   the  
information used in decision making. 
 Executives and Manages can create multiple portfolios and scenarios to 
determine the impact of focusing key resources on a specific set of 
programs 
 Visibility to key milestones and program events is available 
 Time is saved in the preparation of reports and presentations for Program 
status as it can quickly be gathered and/or presented from a single source 
 Program and Resource Managers will have information on the timelines 
for their programs and the usage of resources at a role level required to 
complete those programs.  This will: 
o Allow them to understand the resource impacts to their program 
and  their  Business  Unit’s  resource  pool  in  as a whole 
                                                 
69 Architectural Documentation for Primavera P6 (Washington, D.C.:  2011), Section 6.1. 
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o Provide the ability to perform what-if scenarios to address resource 
conflicts 
 Shifting   an   entire   program’s   timeline   or   a   portion   of   it   to  
determine changes to resource changes 
 Modifying resource allocations within a program to correct 
small resource conflicts 
o Track hours resources are charging to each program to ensure 
resources are correctly allocated to high priority or key programs 
o With better understanding of internal resource usage, this 
information can be used to determine if internal resources can 
replace contractors on specific work, resulting in savings to the 
company  
 System users, such as Program Managers and Resource Managers, will 
begin to learn the system in preparation for the future when more detailed 
planning and analysis are required 
2. Applicability to Private Shipyards 
Although this study reviewed a schedule of the repair of a submarine, the tools 
and methods discussed are applicable to private shipyards.  As discussed in Chapter II, 
section A.3, repair schedules of a submarine are some of the most complex schedules 
seen in project management.  The system complexity, the tight spaces, the nuclear 
reactor, the challenges inherent in repair, and resource competition all contribute to a 
dense integrated schedule.  The tools demonstrating improved scheduling in submarines 
will also aid project management scheduling problems such as new construction.  
Generally, the variability in repair is seen as the biggest factor that leads to variability in 
the given data set.   
A rule of thumb for modern modular ship  construction  is  the  “1-3-8”  rule.    This  
rule emphasizes how much more efficient work is off-hull vice inside the vessel.  A task 
that would take eight hours inside the ship, would take only three hours off-hull in an 
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outfitting building, or only one hour on the shop floor.  Therefore, modern shipyards 
greatly emphasize scheduling construction work in the shop.  According to the winter 
2011  Undersea  Warfare  magazine,  “the  shipbuilders  are  pursuing  an  ambitious  effort   to  
optimize   the   entire   construction   process   and   significantly   shorten   construction   time.”70 
This thesis offers tools and suggestions to support that effort. 
3. Applicability to General Scheduling Problems 
For general scheduling problems, using the tools provided is not necessarily 
unique.  The @Risk software has many features dedicated to solving project management 
schedules.  However, through the literature search, the application of these software tools 
does not appear to have been executed on similar realistic schedules.   
C. FUTURE WORK 
To minimize the makespan of the entire submarine overhaul, each task in the data 
set would need to have a model for the relationship between duration and the number of 
workers.  With this extended data set, the genetic algorithm executed to minimize the 
makespan for the 25 sample tasks could be applied to the entire overhaul.  However, the 
answer generated would still face the uncertainty of the assumed available resources, 
since projects occur not in isolation but in the context of other projects at the shipyard.  
When taken in small subsets over short time periods, such as done in Chapter IV, the 
prediction for available resources is more reliable.  Assumptions about resources 
available over a two year period face greater uncertainty.   
Gabriel   Burnett’s   2011   work   on   RCSP   for   new   construction   of   Virginia  
submarines   addressed   multiple   projects   worked   in   parallel.      As   he   notes,   “multiple  
objective   versions   of   the   problem   [RCSP]   have   not   been  well   studied.”71  Applying a 
methodology similar to his work to the data set from this thesis would be a worthwhile 
future effort.  The conflicts of resource management under the uncertainty of repair are 
                                                 
70 John Holmander and Thomas Plante, "The Four-Module Build Plan,” (Undersea Warfare Nov. 
2011) 7. 
71 Gabriel Burnett, “Multiple Objective Assembly Scheduling with Spatial Resources and Recurring 
Tasks,” (Pennsylvania State University, 2011), 18. 
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likely more problematic for maintenance than the more deterministic schedule in new 
construction shipyards. 
If doing multiple projects, another data source that would be valuable is a 
snapshot of actual resource pools available at a U.S. public shipyard.  Using real historic 
resource pools incorporated into the simulation would provide more accurate conclusions 
in a multi-project RCSP. 
Gaining new construction data would allow a comparison between the 
maintenance data in this thesis.  However, knowledge of the data set and the details of the 
schedule are essential when solving a RCSP.  Also, as shown in Chapter III, the data will 
likely have to be formatted to fit the selected analysis algorithm.  Managing the schedule 
for multi-year projects in new construction and maintenance of ships currently requires 
dozens of managers.  The data must be accompanied by significant background research 
and access to experienced managers.  For instance, reducing the makespan requires 
knowledge of each individual task to understand how increasing resources impacts 
duration.   
Future data sources include new construction of other U.S. Naval combatants.  
Data  on  Virginia  submarine  construction  used  at  Pennsylvania  State’s  Applied  Research  
Lab   is  being  vetted  by  Electric  Boat   for   release   to  MIT’s  PIE  study.     Other  data  could  
include a released version of a baseline Availability Work Package from the Submarine 
Maintenance Engineering Planning and Procurement Activity (SUBMEPP).  SUBMEPP 
prepares the baseline AWP for all submarine maintenance availabilities.  This central 
activity could be tasked to do more detailed simulations in the early pre-planning stages 
to better predict the durations of submarine maintenance schedules.   
The literature review shows that many academic attempts at project management 
problems  are  not   implemented  due  to  a  lack  of  “real-world”  capability.     Too  often,  real  
world constraints, resource allocation limits, or other variables are over-simplified in the 
academic solutions.  However, the complex project management scheduling issues seen 
in real world applications are often kept in proprietary hold out of reach of academia.  
The data set analyzed in this thesis was a notional submarine overhaul schedule.  
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NAVSEA provided the data for Oracle to test Primavera software as a trial for future 
Navy projects.  However, the data is incomplete in its current form.  Attempts by the PIE 
study to gain new construction data for U.S. naval ships remains ongoing. The scope of 
these project management scheduling problems require a broad scope of individuals with 
the proper clearance, management background, and academic research capability.  
Executing these large projects requires dozens of managers.  Fully analyzing such a 
project will require considerable effort.  Clearly though, any progress in improving the 
scheduling of a submarine maintenance project will have demonstrated benefits to all of 








APPENDIX A. FORMATTING DATA 
In order to use the data, the csv files had to be opened within Microsoft Project.  
The public shipyards use a macro program written to import the csv files from PSS 
directly into Microsoft Project.  That macro converted the csv file into the 2007 version 
of Microsoft Project; however it failed when executed in the newer software version.  To 
remedy this, the first step was to take the two csv files, constraints and precedents, and 
combine them into one csv file for upload.   
Then, when importing the csv data into Microsoft Project, the headers from the 
csv data were mapped to appropriate headers in Project.  A screen capture is shown in 
Figure 15 and Table 10 summarizes the changes in column headings and the general 
description of each column. 
 








for MS Project Comment 
 Number1  ID "ID" used by MS Project to identify tasks 
 Name  Name   
 Outline Level  Outline Level   
 Duration  Duration   
 Baseline Duration  Baseline Duration  
 Start Date  Start "Start" vice "Start Date" used by MS Project                       
 Finish Date  Finish "Finish" vice "Finish Date" used by MS Project                   
 Early Start  Early Start   
 Early Finish  Early Finish   
 Late Start  Late Start   
 Late Finish  Late Finish   
 Free Slack  Free Slack   
 Total Slack  Total Slack   
 Percent  Complete  % Complete "% Complete" used by MS Project 
 Actual Start  Actual Start   
 Actual Finish  Actual Finish   
 Baseline Start  Baseline Start   
 Baseline Finish  Baseline Finish   
 Priority  Priority   
 Milestone  Milestone   
 Notes  Notes   
 Constraint Type  Constraint Type All entries are constrained with "Start no Earlier Than" 
 Constraint Date  Constraint Date   
 Text5  Resource Names Supervisor Name 
 Text6  Text6 Ships Work List Item Number (SWLIN) 
 Text7  Text7 Component Unit Identifier (CUI) – item being worked 
 Predecessors  Predecessors   
Deleted Columns:  “Text1”,  “Text2”,  “Text3”,  “Text4”  (all  entries  were  blank)  
Table 10.   Mapping Data from csv Format to Microsoft Project 
 Next, once the import wizard began importing the csv file into Project, a number 
of errors were identified.  A total of 38 errors were attributed to improper comma 
separation  in  the  data.    For  instance,  a  start  date  would  be  listed  as  “6/3/20128/5/2102.”   
This would create more errors as each following entry for that task would be in the wrong 
format.  These errors had to be manually corrected in the source data. 
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Figure 16. Example Error Generated When Importing csv Data 
Note, when changing the heading of the first column  from  “Number1”  to  “ID”  it  
generated an error in Excel when trying to open the subsequent csv file.  This is a known 
error  with  Excel  in  misidentifying  csv  files  as  “sylk”  file  format.72  Instead, the csv file 
was  saved  with  the  title  “Number1”  in  the  first  column  and  the  data  was  mapped  to  “ID”  
using the Microsoft Project import wizard.   
When importing the csv data, another error created was the creation of tasks 
without other information.  The csv data had task IDs that were not sequential.  For 
instance, there was no task ID 138, but Microsoft Project reserved a task ID with that 
identifier.  Of the 4038 tasks, the tasks numbered from 1 to 11761, therefore Microsoft 
Project generated 7723 blank entries.  This is seen in Figure 17. 




Figure 17. Microsoft  Project’s  Creation  of  “Empty”  Tasks  Circled  
Above 
Some of the tasks that Microsoft Project created were not just empty cells, but 
contained dates and other entries.  These entries had dates that did not match the imported 
csv  data.     To  fix  this,   the  task  mode  was  manually  changed  to  “inactivate  task.”     There  
were 97 such entries that all had Early Start, Early Finish, Late Start, and Late Finish 
dates that matched the current date.  Microsoft Project has default actions when reading 
the csv data and made assumptions for dates to match the current date.  
 
 




 Next, the project start date had to be adjusted since the project data provided was 
in   the  past.     This  was  done  under   the  “Project   Information”   tab  as  shown  in  Figure 19. 
Finally,   the   last   step  was   to   create   a   “Project   Summary   Task”   as   shown   in   Figure 20.  
This allowed one entry to record the start and finish dates of the overall project.  The 
duration and finish dates of this Project Summary task were identified as outputs of the 
simulation.   
 
Figure 19. Updating the Start Date and Current Date in the Project 
Information 
 
Figure 20. Selecting a Project Summary Task 
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APPENDIX B. SCHEDULE AUDIT RESULTS 
As discussed in Chapter III, Section C, the @Risk audit tool identified three 
“error”   types:      1)   No   successor   tasks,   2)   No   predecessor   tasks,   and   3)   Tasks   out of 
sequence.    
ID Task ID Task ID Task 
No successor task was assigned to this task. During simulation, simulated schedule 
changes for this task will not delay other tasks. Check if task dependencies are 
missing. 
5 End Guarantee Period 6997 38BAT55506T25 8665 38BAT53407R02 
806 38BAT77201S01 6998 38BAT55506R52 8668 38BAT53407R02 
2662 38BAT12303R12 7001 38BAT55506R28 8904 38BAT13001R12 
3017 38BAT25801H07 7002 38BAT55506R29 8908 38BAT13001R12 
6190 38BAT55507T04 7006 38BAT55506T34 9180 38BAT12305P01 
6240 38BAT55503T20 7191 38BAT55505T07 9181 38BAT12305P01 
6242 38BAT55503T26 7226 38BAT55505T07 9182 38BAT12305P02 
6674 38BAT55505T02 7227 38BAT55505T08 9183 38BAT12305P02 
6683 38BAT55506R29 7228 38BAT55505T09 9835 38BAT25402R04 
6684 38BAT55506T12 7399 38BAT12303R21 9861 38BAT25803R05 
6698 38BAT55506R52 7404 38BAT12303R18 9922 38BAT22101R25 
6712 38BAT65102T01 7405 38BAT12303R19 9923 38BAT22101R25 
6720 38BAT99213R09 7406 38BAT12303R20 10055 38BAT22102R17 
6736 38BAT99213R09 7420 38BAT12303R18 10310 38BAT22102R17 
6895 38BAT55506R15 7421 38BAT12303R19 10332 38BAT31202A01 
6896 38BAT55506R16 7422 38BAT12303R20 10333 38BAT31202A01 
6897 38BAT55506R17 7423 38BAT12303R21 10474 38BAT22101R28 
6898 38BAT55506R18 7425 38BAT12303R14 10857 38BAT53404R02 
6900 38BAT55506R21 7437 38BAT12303R14 10960 38BAT53405R02 
6982 38BAT55506T10 7619 38BAT49505T02 10961 38BAT53405R02 
6983 38BAT55506T11 7620 38BAT49505T02 11255 38BAT25106R06 
6984 38BAT55506T12 8327 38BAT25401R01 11257 38BAT25106R06 
6988 38BAT55506R15 8331 38BAT25401R01 11556 38BAT24301T02 
6989 38BAT55506R16 8333 38BAT25402R04 11641 38BAT45403R05 
6990 38BAT55506R17 8337 38BAT25402R04 11642 38BAT45403T01 
6991 38BAT55506R18 8561 38BAT64402T01 11648 38BAT45403R05 
6993 38BAT55506R20 8563 38BAT64402P02 11684 38BAT45403T01 
6994 38BAT55506R21 8565 38BAT64402P02 11693 38BAT24301T02 
6995 38BAT55506T23         




No predecessor task was assigned to this 
task. During simulation, simulated changes 
to schedules will not affect this task. 







Table 12.   No Predecessor Defined for 5 Tasks 
ID Task Field Contents 
This task starts earlier than its predecessor, even 
though it has a Finish to Start dependency with 
that task. Check if task dependency logic is 
correct. 
230 38BAT56102S02 166 
1913 CA00 8 
2715 FC05 1179 
3869 EG00 5058 
3869 EG00 5059 
3869 EG00 5060 
3869 EG00 5061 
3869 EG00 5094 
3870 EG00 5094 
4140 HX00 8 
4227 HX00 3892 
4227 HX00 6713 
4618 38BAT12310A02 4616 
4621 UD02 4611 
4622 UD02 4612 








APPENDIX C. GRAPHS FOR OPTIMIZING RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION TO MINIMIZE THE MAKESPAN 
 
Figure 21. Fixed Design, Time Required (Makespan) 
 




Figure 23. Fixed Design, Total Shop Idle Time 
 
Figure 24. Flexible Resource Allocation Design, Total Shop Idle Time 
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Figure 25. Fixed Design, Total Task Time 
 
 
Figure 26. Flexible Resource Allocation Design, Total Task Time 
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Figure 27. Flexible Resource Allocation Design, Number of Workers 
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